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Introduction
In a recent article, Cumming (2014) called for two major changes to how psychologists conduct
research. The first suggested change—encouraging transparency and replication—is clearly worth-
while, but we question the wisdom of the second suggested change: abandoning p-values in favor
of reporting confidence intervals (CIs) only in all psychological research reports. This article has
three goals. First, we correct the false impression created by Cumming that the debate about the
usefulness of NHST has been won by its critics. Second, we take issue with the implied connec-
tion between the use of NHST and the current crisis of replicability in psychology. Third, while we
agree with other critics of Cumming (2014) that hypothesis testing is an important part of science
(Morey et al., 2014), we express skepticism that alternative hypothesis testing frameworks, such
as Bayes factors, are a solution to the replicability crisis. Poor methodological practices can com-
promise the validity of Bayesian and classic statistical analyses alike. When it comes to choosing
between competing statistical approaches, we highlight the value of applying the same standards of
evidence that psychologists demand in choosing between competing substantive hypotheses.
Has the NHST Debate been Settled?
Cumming (2014) claims that “very few defenses of NHST have been attempted” (p. 11). In a section
titled “Defenses of NHST,” he summarizes a single book chapter by Schmidt and Hunter (1997),
which in fact is not a defense but another critique, listing and “refuting” arguments for continued
use of NHST1. Thus, graduate students and others who are new to the field might understandably
be left with the impression that the debate over NHST has been handily won by its critics, with little
dissent. This impression is wrong. Indeed, the book that published Schmidt and Hunter’s (1997)
chapter (Harlow et al., 1997) included several defenses (e.g., Abelson, 1997; Mulaik et al., 1997),
and many contributions with more nuanced and varied positions (e.g., Harris, 1997; Reichardt and
Gollob, 1997). Defenses have also appeared in the field’s leading peer-reviewed journals, including
American Psychologist (Krueger, 2001, with commentaries) and APA’s quantitative psychology
journal Psychological Methods (Frick, 1996; Cortina and Dunlap, 1997; Nickerson, 2000). Nicker-
son (2000) provided a particularly careful and thoughtful review of the entire debate and concluded
“that NHST is easily misunderstood and misused but that when applied with good judgment it can
be an effective aid to the interpretation of experimental data” (abstract). Perhaps the most famous
critique of the use of NHST in psychology (Cohen, 1994), published in the American Psychologist,
has seen several defending commentaries (Baril and Cannon, 1995; Frick, 1995; Parker, 1995),
plus a lengthier retort (Hagen, 1997). We do not believe that the debate about the appropriate use
1See Krantz (1999) for a criticism of the faulty logic in this chapter.
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of NHST in psychology has been decisively settled. Further,
the strong NHST-bashing rhetoric common on the “reformers”
side of the debate may prevent many substantive researchers
from feeling that they can voice legitimate reservations about
abandoning the use of p-values.
Is the Replicability Crisis Caused by NHST?
Cumming (2014) connects the current crisis in the field (e.g.,
Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012) to “the severe flaws of null-
hypothesis significance testing (NHST).” In our opinion, the
reliance of psychologists on NHST is a red herring in the debates
about the replicability crisis (see also Krueger, 2001). Cumming
cites Ioannidis (2005) to draw the connection between NHST
and the replicability crisis. Yet, Cumming does not explain how
the fundamental problems articulated by Ioannidis (2005) could
be resolved by abandoning NHST and focusing on CIs. Ioanni-
dis (2005) described the intersecting problems that arise from
running underpowered studies, conducting numerous statistical
tests, and focusing only on the significant results. There is no
evidence that replacing p-values with CIs will circumvent these
problems2. After all, p-values and CIs are based on the same
information, and are thus equivalently susceptible to “hacking.”
While Cumming warns that using CIs in the same way we use
NHST (to reach a binary decision) would be a mistake and advo-
cates not focusing on whether a CI includes zero, it is difficult
to imagine researchers and editors ignoring this salient informa-
tion. In fact, we feel that all claims about the superiority of one
statistical technique over another in terms of facilitating correct
interpretation and reasoning should be supported by evidence, as
we would demand of any other claimmade within our discipline.
The only experimental study evaluating whether presenting data
in terms of CIs reduces binary thinking relative to NHST did not
find this to be the case3 (Hoekstra et al., 2012; see also Poitevineau
and Lecoutre, 2001). Another purported advantage of abolishing
p-values is that using CIs may make it easier to detect common
patterns across studies (e.g., Schmidt, 1996). However, a recent
experiment found that presenting the results of multiple studies
in terms of CIs rather than in NHST form did not improve
meta-analytic thinking (Coulson et al., 2010)4. It has also been
argued that CIs might help improve research practices by mak-
ing low power more salient, because power is directly related
to the width of the confidence interval. There is some evidence
that presenting data in terms of CIs rather than p-values makes
2For instance, Ioannidis’s (2005) main example (Box 1) is a hypothetical study with
the goal to test whether any of the 100,000 gene polymorphisms are associated with
susceptibility to schizophrenia, with the prior odds for any one polymorphism set
to be 0.0001, and with the power of 60% to detect any one association. It is unclear
how this intersection of problems, which plagues all exploratory research, can be
solved with CIs.
3We recognize the irony of drawing a binary inference of no evidence from this
study, but the authors also reach this conclusion (and they also present both CIs
and p-values to support their conclusions).
4Participants were from three different fields with varying statistical practices. As
Coulson et al. (2010) noted: “Confidence intervals have been routinely reported in
medical journals since the mid-1980s, yet our MED (medical) respondents did not
perform notably better than BN (behavioral neuroscience) and PSY (psychology)
respondents” (p. 8).
people less vulnerable to interpreting non-significant results in
under-powered studies as support for the null hypothesis (Fidler
and Loftus, 2009; Hoekstra et al., 2012). Unfortunately, our read-
ing of this research also suggests that using CIs pushed many par-
ticipants in the opposite direction, and they tended to interpret
CIs that include zero as moderate evidence for the alternative
hypothesis. It is worth debating which of these interpretations is
more problematic, a judgment call that may depend on the nature
of the research. Finally, existing data do not support the notion
that CIs are more intuitive. Misinterpretations of the mean-
ing of CIs are as widespread as misinterpretations of p-values5
(Belia et al., 2005; Hoekstra et al., 2014). Abolishing p-values and
replacing them with CIs, thus, is not a panacea.
Successfully addressing the replicability crisis demands fun-
damental changes, such as running much larger studies (Button
et al., 2013; Vankov et al., 2014), directly replicating past work
(Nosek et al., 2012), publishing null results, avoiding questionable
research practices that increase “researcher degrees of freedom”
(Simmons et al., 2011; John et al., 2012), and practicing open sci-
ence more broadly. To the extent that replacing p-values with CIs
appears to be an easy, surface-level “solution” to the replicability
crisis—while doing little to solve the problems that caused the cri-
sis in the first place—this approachmay actually distract attention
away from deeper, more effective changes.
Are Bayes Factors the Solution to the
Replicability Crisis?
Bayes factors have gained some traction in psychology as an alter-
native hypothesis-testing framework (e.g., Rouder et al., 2009;
Dienes, 2011; Kruschke, 2011). This approach may be logically
superior in that Bayes factors directly address the relative evi-
dence for the null hypothesis vs. the alternative. Another major
advantage is that Bayes factors force researchers to articulate their
hypotheses in terms of prior distributions on the effect sizes. A
simple “H1: µ > 0” will no longer do the trick, and the answer
to the question “Is my hypothesis supported by the data?” will
depend on the exact form of that hypothesis. Decades ago, Meehl
(1990) argued that such a development was needed to push the
science of psychology forward.
In the wake of the replicability crisis, some have argued that
switching to Bayesian hypothesis testing can help remedy the
bias against publishing non-significant results because, unlike
NHST, Bayes factors allow researchers to establish support for the
null (Dienes, 2014). More evidence is needed, however, that the
switch to Bayes factors will have this effect. To the extent that
the real source of publication bias is the pressure felt by journal
editors to publish novel, striking findings, the rate of publica-
tion of null results will not increase, even if those null results
are strongly supported by a Bayesian analysis. Further, when it
comes to questionable research practices, one can “b-hack” just
as one can “p-hack” (Sanborn and Hills, 2014; Simonsohn, 2014;
Yu et al., 2014). In fact, Bayes factors and the values of the clas-
sic t-test are directly related, given a set sample size and choice
5 In fact, Cumming (2014) himself gives some decidedly Bayesian interpretations
of CIs.
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of prior (Rouder et al., 2009; Wetzels et al., 2011). Although
some have argued that the options for “b-hacking” are more lim-
ited (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2007, in an online appendix; Dienes,
2014; Rouder, 2014), no statistical approach is immune to poor
methodological practices.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Simmons et al. (2011), using
Bayes factors further increases “researcher degrees of freedom,”
creating another potential QRP, because researchers must select
a prior—a subjective expectation about the most likely size of the
effect—for their analyses. Although the choice of prior is often
inconsequential (Rouder et al., 2009), different priors can lead
to different conclusions. For example, in their critique of Bem’s
(2011) article on pre-cognition, Wagenmakers et al. (2011) have
devoted much space to the reanalysis of the data using Bayes fac-
tors, and less to pointing out the exploratory flexibility of many
of Bem’s (2011) analyses. Bem’s response to this critique (Bem
et al., 2011) was entirely about the Bayesian analyses—debating
the choice of prior for psi. Given that the publication of Bem’s
(2011) article was one of the factors that spurred the current cri-
sis, this statistical debate may have been a red herring, distracting
researchers from the much deeper concerns about QRP’s.
Conclusion
We agree with Cumming (2014) that raw effect sizes and
the associated CIs should routinely be reported. We also
believe that Bayes factors represent an intriguing alterna-
tive to hypothesis testing via NHST. But, at present we lack
empirical evidence that encouraging researchers to abandon
p-values will fundamentally change the credibility and repli-
cability of psychological research in practice. In the face of
crisis, researchers should return to their core, shared value
by demanding rigorous empirical evidence before instituting
major changes.
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